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Attitudes towards Radiation Protection
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I. | Nuclear energy versus radiation protection: a matter of historical precedence. |
The extensive use of atomic energy in industrialised nations was initiated by the 1955 Geneva Conference, were U.S. President Eisenhower proclaimed the "Atoms for Peace" program . During this conference the opening speech by H. J. Muller, a renowned geneticist and winner of the Nobel Prize, was cancelled at the last minute through intrigues on the part of interested circles. Back in the Thirties Muller had discovered the principle of stochastic radiation detriment without threshold dose and he warned against adverse effect of additional radiation exposure on the human genetic pool. When Gofman and Tamplin published their book "Poisoned Power" in July 1973 [1], they were no longer working as consultants for the Atomic Energy Commission, the American authority for development of nuclear power. Their work showed as well, that the anti-nuclear movement had its roots among nuclear scientists. Experts and insiders recognised very early that the enormous amounts of artificially produced radioactivity cannot be contained safely. These scientists were, therefore, excluded by the official authorities from the discussions about appropriate dose limits and radiation protection standards. The International Commission for Radiation Protection (ICRP) has ever since its inception in the early 1950s laid down the essential recommendations for world-wide radiation protection regulations without any democratic legitimisation. Nor have the members of the ICRP been elected during an international congress of radiation experts. The ICRP itself selects it s new members. Pretending to base its selection exclusively on scientific competence, the ICRP has consistently refused nominations for membership from groups of independent scientists, unions or environmental groups. In this way, the ICRP perpetuates itself and its pro-nuclear technology bias. This takes place under the auspices of the International Radiological Society. Karl Z. Morgan, former long-time member and president of the ICRP describes the large initial influence of radiologists on the recommendations, followed by the close connections of ICRP-members to the development of nuclear weapons and the influence of Cold War politics of the USA on the commission [2]. When he expressed his concern about the one-sided policy of the ICRP publicly he was ostracised and discriminated against by this organisation. Similar experiences were made by Edward Radford, who was Chairman of the BEIR III-Committee, an expert body of the U.S. Academy of Sciences, which reviewed the state of knowledge about biological effects of ionising radiation. In 1979 this committee had compiled revised evaluations concerning radiation risks which were considerably higher than those published by the ICRP. On the basis of an influential minority vote the originally adopted report was never published, except as a minority addendum. The president of the Academy installed a sub-group with assured majority to revise the report. The final report III was published in 1980 and contained the old risk values according to the ICRP. Radford was expelled from the radiation establishment. The denigrations only ceased ten years later when his results were confirmed by the successive BEIR V committee.
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II. | Erosion of the obligation to minimise radiation load. |
To minimise radiation load is one of the three most important aims of the German radiation protection regulations - the other two are to prevent radiation exposure and to formulate radiation limits. The basic concept is to avoid unnecessary radiation exposure or contamination of persons, objects or the environment on the one hand. On the other hand, if exposure is "necessary" there is an obligation to keep the exposure or contamination as low as possible, preferably below the radiation limits. The criterion for the scale of minimisation is observance of state-of-the-art science and technology; to be considered in each individual case. In no case, however, may the radiation load of a single person exceed the limits laid down in the radiation protection regulations, by which means "deterministic detriments” (acute radiation damage, for example) is to be avoided. (section 28, subsection 1, German Radiation Protection Regulations [§ 28 Abs. 1 StrlSchV]).
The described principles of radiation protection which were already mentioned in the first Radiation Protection Regulations of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1960 are based on ICRP recommendations published in 1959. The ICRP states In connection with the minimising obligation, the so-called ALARA principle, which means doses should be as low as reasonably achievable taking into account economic and social factors. This supplement is an essential part of the ICRP recommendations.
The minimising obligation in the formulation of section 28 of the German Radiation Protection Regulations is far more radical than the ALARA-principle. By linking the minimising obligation to state-of-the-art science and technology, the German regulations can be expressed as the ALASTA-principle: as low as scientifically and technically achievable. The justification can be found in Article 2 of the German constitution which guarantees the protection of life and health without any restrictions whatsoever. Exceptions due to the inclusion of economic and social factors (cost/benefit considerations) as implied in the ALARA principle of the ICRP are alien to the German judicial system. This interpretation is also shared by the Federal Constitutional Court in its "Kalkar verdict” dating from 1978, in which the Court ruled that from the constitutional standpoint the licensing and operation of a nuclear plant have to be rejected if residual or minimal detriments are to be expected from the operation of the plant. Such damage is not recognised by nuclear legislation and represents a violation of basic rights.
In practice, however, the original intention was often ignored in Germany and the minimising principle severely eroded. This can be exemplified by the permission to operate nuclear plants. Up to now the limitation of the maximal permissible emission of radioactivity by nuclear plants into air and water has been based primarily on internal requirements and only secondarily on limiting radiation exposure to the population at large. The emission limits for radionuclides were set so high in operating licenses that operations could be continued even in the event of faults or failures. Even under "normal" running conditions, the nuclear plant operating company is not necessarily compelled to improve their radioactivity retention in line with the state of art. On the contrary, they are even allowed to have higher emissions instead of reaching out for an attainable minimum. In this connection the role of experts in the authorisation process for nuclear plants has to be mentioned, especially the role of the German Safety Standards Authority (TÜV). This agency never expressed objections to that practice.
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III. | The development of radiation protection standards characterised by permanent misinterpretation of the health hazards. |
Until the early Sixties, the mutagenic action of low-dose ionising radiation was considered a hazard only for the gene pool. The risk to the unborn child of malformations and even death in utero and the risk of cancer in those exposed to radiation was assessed as negligible. Findings of the contrary of a major study of childhood cancers following fetal irradiation in the mid Fifties by Stewart et al.[3] was refuted and ignored. Based on observations of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki populations in 1965, the cancer risk was estimated to amount to ten additional leukemia deaths per ten thousand person Sievert (Sv). This was still the official version up to 1976 when the radiation protection regulations were revised.
In 1977 the ICRP published a new risk coefficient of one hundred additional cancer deaths per ten thousand person Sievert, a ten-fold higher risk value. In its recommendation No. 60 dating from 1990, the ICRP increased the cancer risk coefficient again by a factor of five to 500 additional cancer deaths per ten thousand person Sievert. The genetic risk to future generations was quantified as equivalent to 230 additional cancer deaths per ten thousand person Sievert.
Despite the drastic increase of adopted risk factors, an appropriate evaluation of these numbers in light of all published reports of the biological effects of ionising radiation in the low dose range, has not taken place (see below). (see Attitude IV).
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6th August 1998
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Köhnlein,
Münster, FRG
President of the German Society for Radiation Protection
(Gesellschaft für Strahlenschutz e.V.)
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| http://www.gfstrahlenschutz.de/en/detmen2.htm Last Update: 15.02.1999 Responsible: Prof. Kuni, horst@kuni.org | Homepage Prof. Kuni |